CHAPTER V111
THE ACTION OF LE CATEAU CONTINUED

s
(A) THE OPENING OF THE ACTION
(SEE MAPS 2 & 5 and sketch )

At the outset the 19th Infantry Brigade which had bivouacked overnight near Le Cateau railway station,
passed through the town and marched past the Pont Des Quatre Vaux in order to reach its place in the
retiring column. The head of the Brigade debouched from Le Cateau at 5:30 am but before the column
was clear of the town its rearguard collided in the streets with Germans.
To the east of Le Cateau at 6:30 am as the detached portion of the 14th Infantry Brigade was about to
commence its march through the town in order to concentrate with the rest of its Brigade and take its
place in the marching column, a heavy rifle fire was opened on it from the eastern end of Le Cateau
and soon after it came under shell fire.
Rallying immediately from the first surprise the two Regiments made a fine fighting retirement along
the spur to the south, in which, General Gough,s Cavalry and “D” Battery RHA co-operated. The spur
of Le Cateau was clear of our Infantry by noon.
This unfortunate occurrence laid bare, from the start of the action, the right flank of the troops
of the Fifth Division west of Le Cateau, who were holding the spur to the east of Roman Road.
The units immediately affected being the 2/Suffolk Regiment and the XV RFA with 37 (Hows),
all of whom had received orders to maintain their positions to the last. From the very outset
therefore the Germans possessed a covered line of approach, the valley of the Selle, and a
covered concentration area, Le Cateau itself.
The situation on the right was critical from the commencement.

4th Division (see Maps 4 and 5)
In this section the 11th Infantry Brigade held the right of the line along the spur, north of the
Warnelle Ravine, in front of Ligny: whilst the 12th Infantry Brigade held the left flank in front
of Harcourt.
The Divisional Artillery came into action as follows - XXX11 were detailed to support 11th Infantry
Brigade, and 27 unlimbered in the open to the west of the village of Ligny, whilst 134 took position
under cover immediately to the south west of that place, and 135 was behind cover to the left rear of 27,
though it did not fire from this position.
The llth Infantry Brigade had asked for artillery co-operation to divert from them some of the German
gun fire to which they were being subjected. Consequently XXXII were brought into action as rapidly
as possible. 27 came into action among the corn stooks in a stubble-field, and about twenty-five yards
in front of a hollow road, the O.P. being on the. right, on slightly higher ground about forty yards away.
XXIX were ordered into action south-east of Haucourt to cooperate with the llth Infantry Brigade, north
of the Warm Ravine. 127 to the south of the village fired mainly in the direction of the Quarries in
front of the llth Infantry Brigade. 126 more to the south fired chiefly to the east of Moulin d'Esnes.
125 was on the right bank of the Iris stream to the east of 120, and was used largely for counter-battery
work along the ridge north of the ravine.
XXXVII (Hows.) came into action in the d'lris valley facing north, but whilst in this position did not fire.
XIV moved to Haucourt at 7 am. and on arrival found the Infantry sharply engaged. Its duty was to support
the 12th Infantry Brigade, and 68 came into action at once just west of the village, 39 was about
three-quarters of a mile in rear, with 88 in the valley-head to the east of S. Aubert Fme.

It was nearing 7 am. when the German onslaught opened seriously in this quarter. Then their vastly
superior Artillery and machine-guns prepared and covered an attack on Haucourt. A vigorous artillery
duel was the immediate result, and during its continuance there can be no doubt the Fourth Division
felt acutely the absence of its Heavy Battery.

In XXXII, both 27 and 134 searched for guns behind the ridge near Fontaine-au-pire. 27 being in action
in the open drew down on itself a heavy return fire from several Batteries, which it did its best to
keep employed in order to draw the fire off its own Infantry. Locating one battery (at 3650 yards)
27 silenced it except one gun, direct hits being reported on two of the others. This German Battery
had been engaged shelling our Infantry, but their switch on to 27 was very slow, and 27 was able to
begin Battery fire before the Germans had finished ranging. The issue of that duel was then no longer
in doubt. 27 was then engaged by two or three German Batteries, and it became impracticable to bring- up
any more ammunition to the guns, the detachments therefore were withdrawn under cover until the

German Infantry advanced. Up to this moment the casualties inflicted on the Battery had been very few,
for most of the H.K. shell burst on or beyond the sunken road.
On this part of the front the attack at this stage was not pressed so strongly as it was against the
right flank nor do there seem to have been so many hostile Batteries in action. The Germans not having
enveloped the open flank at the commencement of the Action were unable to bring as heavy and accurate
fire to bear on it as they did on the right flank in the vicinity of the roman road.

 

(B) THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE ACTION (9am to Noon)
4th Division (see map 4)

Here on the left flank the Artillery duel was the principal feature until noon. Meanwhile, about 9.30 am
a position having been found for 135, of XXXII, to the north of Ligny, suitable for the close defence of
that place in conjunction with the 11th Infantry Brigade, the Battery was brought into action in sections
which were entrenched behind the hedges to the north and north-east of village.
Although dispersed the sections were fairly dose together, a double line of communications connecting
the centre and left sections whilst the right section (which later had one of its guns near the station)
was supervised by the Captain. Two wagons were placed with each gun and the teams were kept in readiness
among the houses.

The village of Ligny was a very important point. Its loss, as well as jeopardising the position held by
the Fourth Division, would affect the Third Division quite as materially. Once the Germans occupied this
village they could enfilade 'all the ground round Tronquoy and Muntigny. It was essential to hold the
village, and the arrangement to allot guns for its close defence was obvious a sound one.
To the west of Ligny, 27 knocked out a machine gun for the 11th Infantry Brigade; but the Germans
immediately opened so many Batteries on it that the ammunition could not be replenished and when it
was nearly exhausted the detachments were withdrawn until the storm subsided.
By this time the Germans had put a direct hit on the under shield of No 5 Gun. Soon after a pause
occurred and ammunition was replenished in all the wagons being brought up by hand along the road in rear,
and the wheel of No 5 gun were replaced from the Wagon Body.
Later on 27 was ordered to cover the retirement of our Infantry, but the Battery was
unsuitably placed to Carry out this task. As our Infantry in front fell back, 27 opened on a
German Battery in action close to the one it had knocked out earlier in the morning.
But this activity drew down an intense return fire from a Heavy as well as from two field Batteries.
An Infantry Brigade Major now came up to the BC and said that the Battery, by drawing the German fire
on to itself, was doing just what the Infantry wanted.
The Battery managed to keep in action until its ammunition ran out.
Then, as no more could be brought up, the men were once again withdrawn under cover.
XXXVII (Hows.) did not fire from their first position and it was not long before the
Howitzer Brigade moved back a short distance to a better position in the valley to the east of Selvigny.
The sector allotted to this Brigade was to the eastward of a north south line through Haucourt.
Soon after XXXVII had taken up-its position Lieut.-Colonel Battiscombe saw a German officer,
followed by an orderly carrying a black and white flag, gallop along the crest of the spur beyond
the Warnelle Ravine. The Batteries were warned. Presently some gun-teams appeared and directly
afterward; gun-shields were seen. A howitzer battery at once opened fire and smothered the German guns,
and the latter never got off a single round.
XXIX and XIV maintained their original positions and continued their activity.
Beyond the left flank the pressure had been slight. Except 27 which was in action in an
exposed position, the Artillery of the Fourth Division were practically intact at the end of this
phase and ready for any eventuality.

C) THE CRISIS OF THE AFTERNOON - Noon to 1:45pm
4th Division (see map 4)

In this division the Artillery remained in action although more severely tried than in Third Division.
At 12.10 pm. the Division was able to report to the Second Corps that ' my guns are keeping down the fire
on Ligny. At that time the village was held by the
six guns of 135, together with 200 men and two machine guns. 135 were engaged by two German field guns
which were run up by hand close to Fontame-au-pire, only 2,500 yards away. A section was at once turned
on to them and eight shrapnel sufficed for the business, numerous casualties being observed.
Any attempt made by the German Infantry to advance was heavily punished by this Battery, and no attack on
Ligny was pressed home whilst 135 remained in action.
The rolling down in its front gave the Battery an ideal chance to smash up any Infantry advance and it was
quick to avail itself of it.
During the afternoon, the sky becoming overcast, the brigade Commander went up to the guns of 27 with the BC,
but any movement there at once drew down heavy fire and all idea of getting them out before dark was
temporarily abandoned.
Later they were again visited, when it was found that trails were so deeply embedded that they could
not be lifted until the around them had been loosened.

Two batteries of XXXV11 (Hows) 31 & 55 engaged German artillery from their new positions but no results
could be ascertained.
The enemy responded but the shells were chiefly over and no serious damage was done, though the Germans
shooting improved after two aeroplanes had flown over the Brigade; but even so the Howitzers were never
accurately located.
Towards the close of this phase German Infantry were seen advancing in strength across the ridge north of
Longsart and two of the Howitzer batteries opened on them at ranges varying from 4,500 to 3,500 yards.
Our Infantry reported that considerable effect was obtained. Probably with the idea of
supporting this attack the Germans had placed one or more machine guns in the Moulin d'Esnes and their
fire was particularly galling to the two companies of the
2/ Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers that held Esnes.
The Mill was set on fire — probably by the Howitzers — to the great relief of the Infantry.
About this time 68 and 39 fell back to a position alongside and the whole of XIV was then in action to
the east of S. Aubert Fme.
In this section, as in that of the Third Division, nothing had occurred to shake the hold of the troops
on their position, which they could certainly have maintained until dark, had it been necessarv to do
so and had not the situation on the Right Flank dictated otherwise.

D) THE RETIREMENT AFTER 1:45PM
SEE MAPS 2 & SKETCH B
4th Division (see map 4)

Just before 2 p.m. the German Artillery opened a heavy fire on Haucourt and the ground to the south.
Shortly afterwards XX1X was ordered to withdraw by batteries, and 127 and 126 succeeded in moving
through this barrage with comparatively slight casualties. The Batteries fell back to a position in
the Iris Valley between Caullery and Selvigny.
Probably about the same time XIV retired to a position north of Selvigny

At 4 pm. further arrangements were made necessary to withdraw from the position.
It was now that 35 (Hows) were ordered to move further back to a position behind the railway, so as
to be able to cover the retirement of the rest of XXXV11.
Whilst carrying out this move along the road to the south the Battery was shelled and lost one man
and one horse killed, as well as two men and several horses wounded, being forced also to abanden
an ammunition wagon.
Meanwhile the other Howitzer Batter: 31 and 55--stood their ground and assisted to cover XXXII.

About 5 pm, most of the troops in front having fallen back, and being without any orders,
Lieut Colonel Battiscombe, on his own initiative, ordered 31 and 55 to limber up and retire.
It was clear that the road used by 35 was registered, consequently the other two batteries were
withdrawn through Selvigny.
When quite clear the brigade commander halted them under cover and then rode off to find 35 and
lead it back to the rest of the brigade.
At 4;30pm the CRA issued orders to the BACs that the fourth division was retiring via Selvigny -
Malincourt - Villers Outreaux and the columns moving at once via Elincourt. Were to join the
main column at Walincourt.
The doings of X1V at the conclusion of this phase, in fact all day, are shrouded in obscurity.
Had it not been for the sketch among the GS papers of the fourth division the various positions
of the three batteries could not have been conjectured.
In XX1X 125 was the last battery of its brigade to retire, it was the rearmost one of the three,
being in action in the Iris valley to the west of Ligny. It limbered up under cover and then
succeeded in getting across the 200 yards of open, immediately behind it without suffering any casualties.
The real strain of saving their guns was reserved for 27 and 135 (both of XXX11)
It will be recollected that 135 was in action, in dispersed sections, for close co-operation with
the 11th Infantry brigade in the defence of Ligny, to which the Brigade had now
back.
About 3.30 pm. masses of German infantry showed up along the railway line, advancing in pursuit
from Caudry and Beauvois. Fire was promptly opened on them and great execution was done.
The Battery remained in position ready for any target that offered, and by 5 p.m. most of our
Infantry had retired to Ligny; but 135 still held on to cover any further retirement.
Any serious pressure must have caused the loss of the guns in their exposed position, but in
this quarter the Germans had been taught a lesson and were very chary of closing as long as
135 was waiting to receive them.
Consequently it was decided to make an attempt to withdraw the guns, although orders to abandon
them had been received from the B G C 11th Infantry Brigade. Major Liveing decided that the
guns could be saved, and the men hauled them out of action by hand so that they could be limbered up.
Then as the situation did not appear critical he wagons were drawn back in a similar fashion,
only one body being left behind.
By this time the Germans had dribbled forward into dead ground, consequently two sections stood
by with 80 shrapnel per gun, fuses set at "0" to deal with the last stage of the attack.
Actually they were not wanted and the Battery retired through Ligny, being the last unit to leave
that place and took the road to Caullery.
Note !!
Le Cateau is the first War service recorded in the history of the battery. 135 with 134 were formed
at Sheffield in 1900. The author had the honour to be the first commanding officer of 135. Major Living
was awarded the D.S.O for his work with the battery on this day.

The task performed by the senior battery in the brigade was even more difficult than that of 135.
The guns of 27 battery (raised in 1794- in August 1913, 27 changed numbers, records and services
with 136 Battery via order 220) had been temporarily abandoned after the ammunition was exhausted,
but the detachments remained under cover close at hand, to withdraw them directly darkness fell.
The C.R.A. himself saw the battery in action after the infantry had retired from its vicinity.
Probably it was well after 5 p.m. when, realising that Ligny must shortly be entered by the Germans,
the Brigade commander of XXX11 called for volunteers from the battery to run out the guns by hand.
The BC Major Vallentin and the whole battery volunteered immediately.
Men were then dribbled forward to the guns and keeping under the cover of the shields they set to work
with picks and loosened the earth round the trails.
During pauses in the shelling a gun or a limber was run back to the road. Thus, by dint of steady work
and seizing the opportunities offered, four guns and four limbers were withdrawn into the sunken road
in rear.
Then suddenly the firing increased and when the detachments were working on the next gun a heavy and
accurate fire opened on the Battery.
A second attempt met with the same fate and most unwillingly it was decided that the enterprise must
be abandoned, for its continuance might lead to its total failure. Forming up the four guns under cover,
they waited their time and then made a sudden dash to the pursued by German shells — fortunately all
were very short. These four guns were saved.
Note !!
Major Vallentin was awarded the D.S.O and the D.C.M was given to 2 Sergeants and 5 Gunners.

Whilst this phase of the action was in progress heavy firing was heard to the west.
This proved to be the 75mms with General Sordet's Cavalry Corps coming into action and letting
drive at any Germans that showed.
This reinforcement was most welcome and proved a sufficient deterrent on this flank.
It is clear that the pressure on the Fourth Division was far less severe than it had been on
the Fifth Division. In fact, merely considering how the action ran its course to the west of Caudry,
nothing had occurred in its own area to necessitate the withdrawal of Fourth Division and, generally speaking, it got away without great difficulty and in fairly good formation.
Consequently the withdrawal of the guns was achieved with hardly any serious loss, but this does
not detract from the work of the officers and men of the two exposed batteries - 27 and 135,
who were determined to ensure that when their batteries retired they should do so as efficient fighting units.

E) COVERING POSITIONS
4th Division (no mention of 32 Brigade)